None of the above cases prevents or limits applying the Trustee’s fee calculation to only “payments” or capital flowing from the bankruptcy estate.
Hess’ Sons, Inc
We reverse the district court. Given the way that the word “disbursement” has been used in the caselaw, and that the caselaw in a variety of jurisdictions interprets “disbursement” broadly in various contexts, we follow our precedent in In re Jamko, 240 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir.2001) and hold that the plain meaning of “disbursement” and the plain meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) as applied in this case require Cash Cow to pay the Trustee its required quarterly fees on the consumer loans made by Cash Cow to its customers, as well as Cash Cow’s other disbursements, payments, or capital which flowed from the bankruptcy estate.
There is somewhat limited caselaw on the word “disbursement” with https://www.paydayloanstennessee.com/cities/gallatin/ respect to 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6). See, e.g., In re Jamko, Inc., 240 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir.2001) (holding that the Trustee fee includes all disbursements, including those made in the ordinary course of business and not limited to payments made to creditors or those made pursuant to a debtor’s confirmed plan); In re N. , 218 B.R. 354 (Bankr.D.Md.1998) (holding that “disbursements” include all post-confirmation expenditures by debtor until the case is dismissed, converted, or closed, including monies disbursed in the ordinary course of the Debtor’s business); In re Postconfirmation Fees, 224 B.R. 793 (E.D.Wash.1998) (holding that disbursement means all funds paid out, citing St. Angelo v. Victoria Farms, 38 F.3d 1525 (9th Cir.1994), and that funds paid out include all operating expenses and post-confirmation expenditures of the reorganized debtor); In re Pars Leasing, 217 B.R. 218 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1997) (holding that, where sole source of revenue for debtor-in-possession came from payments received under vehicle leases for truck tractors owned by debtor, “disbursements” includes not only actual cash disbursements made by debtor, but also those cash disbursements for expenses made by common carriers pursuant to lease agreements with debtor); In re Flatbush Assoc., 198 B.R. 75 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1996) (holding that payment of rents directly from debtor’s subtenants to co-op constitute “disbursements” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1930 because the rents were property of the debtor’s estate and were being used to offset an expense of the estate); In re HSSI, Inc., 193 B.R. 851 (N.D.Ill.1996) (construing disbursement to mean a transfer of money by the debtor in possession where the debtor has some interest in that money); In re Meyer, 187 B.R. 650 (Bankr.W.D.1995) (holding that money paid out by an escrow agent as the proceeds in which the debtor had an interest are disbursements subject to quarterly fees); St. Angelo v. Victoria Farms, 38 F.3d 1525 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that “disbursements” include all payments from the bankruptcy estate, i.e. all funds paid out, and do not exclude payments to a secured creditor from the sale proceeds of the secured party); In re Hays Builders, Inc., 144 B.R. 778 (W.D.Tenn.1992) (holding that a disbursement is any payment, and that all disbursements, whether direct or through a third party, are included of the calculation of fees due to the U.S. Trustee under § 1930); In re Wernerstruck, Inc., 130 B.R. 86 (D.S.D.1991) (holding that debtor’s payment to bank are disbursements within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1930 whether or not they are the required annual payment or prepayment on the loan, and citing In re Ozark Beverage Co., Inc., saying that a disbursement is any payment); In re Ozark Beverage Co., Inc., 105 B.R. 510 (Bankr.E.D.1989) (refusing to limit “disbursements” to post-petition payments made to pre-petition debtors; disbursements encompass all expenses paid by debtor in possession).